Late in September 2025, a new phase of the protracted standoff over Iran's nuclear program began. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, denounced any negotiations with the United States in a televised speech on September 23 and described them as "a sheer dead end" (apnews.com, newsweek.com). His comments, made from Tehran during a meeting between Iranian diplomats and European officials at the United Nations, highlight the profound mistrust that persists following years of fruitless diplomatic attempts. Reviewing Iran's nuclear past, the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear agreement, and the regional and international responses to Khamenei's most recent remarks are all necessary to comprehend the current standoff.
Historical background: Iran’s nuclear programme and the JCPOA
Iran’s nuclear programme dates back decades, and its scope has long drawn international scrutiny. By the early 2000s Iran had mastered uranium enrichment, raising concerns it could someday build a bomb. After intense negotiations and heavy Western sanctions, Iran agreed in July 2015 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Under the JCPOA, Iran dismantled much of its enrichment capacity and accepted strict limits on centrifuges, enrichment levels and stockpiles in exchange for relief from UN, EU and US nuclear-related sanctions. The accord – negotiated by Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, plus Germany) – took effect in January 2016en.wikipedia.orgcfr.org.
The goal of the agreement was to extend Iran's "breakout time," or the amount of time required to produce enough fissile material for a bomb, from a few months to roughly a year. Additionally, it allowed for previously unheard-of inspections of Iran's nuclear sites, including inside previously classified buildings. JCPOA proponents contended that it would lessen the likelihood of regional conflict . Critics in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other countries, however, cautioned that the restrictions were insufficient and voiced worry that Iran's regional activities and missile program were not taken into consideration.
When US President Donald Trump, who was in office at the time, unilaterally withdrew the US from the JCPOA in May 2018, it fell apart cfr.org. The Trump administration pledged to cut Iran's oil exports to zero and reinstated "maximum pressure" sanctions on the country's banking, oil, and other industries. Iran responded by progressively lifting many of the JCPOA's restrictions. It began enriching uranium above allowed limits in a matter of months. By 2019, Tehran publicly disregarded the agreement's restrictions on stockpiles and enrichment (cfr.org). Iran escalated further over the following few years, increasing its stock of enriched uranium and creating sophisticated centrifuges.
Iran had enriched uranium to almost weapons-grade purity (about 60%) by early 2023, according to the UN nuclear watchdog, which is unprecedented since before the JCPOA cfr.r apnews.com. The JCPOA limit of 3.67% was significantly exceeded by even 20% enrichment, another crucial threshold. Western governments warned that Iran was getting closer to a potential bomb, despite Iranian officials' insistence that their program remained peaceful. In 2021, President Joe Biden declared that if Iran first returned to full compliance, the United States would rejoin the JCPOA. But in reality, years of sporadic diplomacy have yielded no significant progress. More than two years of negotiations had produced "nowhere near a compromise," according to CFR analysts as of late 2023, and important aspects of the agreement were starting to lapse.
Since the US withdrawal, diplomatic efforts
European powers (the UK, France, and Germany, or the E3), along with the EU and other nations, worked to maintain the agreement after the US withdrew. In order to facilitate trade, Brussels established a special payment mechanism called INSTEX, and the IAEA made every effort to ensure compliance. The Biden administration alternated between maintaining pressure and offering negotiations in Washington. In 2021–2022, indirect negotiations with Iranian envoys were resumed in Vienna; however, they repeatedly stalled on issues such as removing sanctions and confirming Iran’s demands.
In 2024–2025, tensions increased even more. In the middle of 2025, Iran's parliament passed a law suspending cooperation with the IAEA after the agency disclosed unidentified nuclear sites. Hardliners in Tehran remained doubtful of any U.S. outreach, despite a brief attempt at engagement through Omani mediation in April 2025 (with former US Ambassador Steve Witkoff serving as a special envoy). Following Trump's destruction of the 2015 agreement, Supreme Leader Khamenei himself openly questioned why Iran should engage in negotiations with Trump's team thesoufancenter.org.
In the meantime, the atmosphere became even more complicated when Israel and the US launched a series of unprecedented strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities in June 2025 (the 12-day Iran–Israel conflict). Although sites like Fordow and Natanz suffered severe damage as a result of those attacks, Iran's fundamental knowledge and scientific expertise remained unaltered. Though at significant strategic risk, analysts pointed out that Iran still had the option to "resurrect its program to pre-war levels" if it so desired.
In light of this, Europe intensified its attempts to save diplomacy. According to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the E3 activated the so-called "snapback" mechanism in late August 2025. Unless a diplomatic agreement was reached, this 30-day process would automatically reimpose all UN sanctions on Iran on September 27 (reuters.com apnews.com). The snapback was essentially veto-proof because the E3 nations could still compel the process at the UN despite Washington's formal renunciation of its snapback right after it exited the JCPOA. In reality, this meant that Europe imposed strict requirements on Iran: it had to return to full IAEA access, explain its increased uranium stockpile, and—most importantly—resume direct talks with the US if it wished to extend the period before sanctions were reinstated.
Iran, on the other hand, deemed those demands unjust. Its Foreign Ministry only agreed to "continue consultations" with the Europeans and cautioned that reimposing the UN sanctions was "unjustified and illegal."
rferl.org. Early in September, Abbas Araghchi, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, met with EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and the E3 foreign ministers (France's Jean-Yves Le Drian, Germany's Annalena Baerbock, and Britain's David Cameron) on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. There was no breakthrough from the meeting. If Iran wanted the sanctions deadline to be extended, EU officials insisted that it must demonstrate "real action," such as permitting inspections and engaging in US negotiations.After "all of Iran's delaying tactics," Germany's foreign minister had already warned the day before that there was "very little chance" of a deal before the deadline.
Therefore, diplomacy had essentially stalled by the deadline's eve. Iran rejected the crucial requirement of direct US dialogue, despite European officials stating that they were still open to negotiations. Iran maintained that its demands had not been fulfilled, including assurances against further attacks and an exemption from the need to stop enrichment. The situation was dire because sanctions were about to "snap back" on September 27.
Khamenei's recent position of "no negotiation"
On September 23, 2025, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, gives a televised speech. In that speech, he categorically rejected US demands while restating Iran's long-standing position that its nuclear program is peaceful.
Khamenei gave his most recent speech on nuclear doctrine on state television on September 23 against this tense background. He stated unequivocally that Iran would never engage in negotiations with Washington under the current circumstances. He claimed that negotiations with the United States were "a sheer dead end" and that American officials had already "announced the results of the talks in advance," specifically the total cessation of Iran's nuclear and enrichment activities (apnews.com). "The outcome is the closure of nuclear activities and enrichment," he stated. There is no negotiation here. It is an imposition, a diktat.
apnews.com
The message was clear: Iran would not be forced to stop its enrichment program.
Khamenei emphasized that he was discussing "the current circumstances" with the U.S. government while contrasting Iran's stance with that of Israel and the U.S. He made it clear that his criticism was aimed at Washington's demands by excluding Europe from his rebuke apnews.com. Additionally, he reiterated Iran's well-known stance on weapons: "We do not have a nuclear bomb and we will not have one, and we do not plan to use nuclear weapons," he told apnews.com. Likewise, he maintained that only a bomb-seeking state enriches uranium above 60%; Iran "has decided not to pursue nuclear arms, so we have increased our level of enrichment to 60%" solely for peaceful reasons.
As President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi held high-level negotiations in New York, Khamenei's speech was televised. It essentially established boundaries for future negotiations: Iran refused to give up its enrichment rights and would not engage in talks under what it described as "unjust" pressure from the United States. The Supreme Leader even threatened to "slap" anyone who suggested ending their enrichment program, according to newsweek.com. "Science will not be demolished by threats and bombing," he added, assuring his own people that Iran's nuclear capabilities had not been destroyed by the Israeli and American strike.The main points of Khamenei's speech were that Western demands would be fiercely opposed and that Iran would continue on its current nuclear path.
U.S., European, Israeli, and regional stakeholders' responses
The world responded quickly to Khamenei's public refusal to back down. Europe's reaction was one of both concern and resolve. Following their discussions in New York, EU leaders reaffirmed their demands that Iran fulfill its JCPOA commitments. For example, Germany's foreign office stated that the E3 had warned Iran that sanctions would be reinstated if it did not resume talks and IAEA access immediately, even within "days or hours."European leaders presented their message as a final opportunity: The Middle East cannot be at peace until Iran's nuclear program "is once again fully under control," French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters. Macron even offered to meet with the Iranian president in order to reach an agreement, but he cautioned that "sanctions will have to be imposed" in the absence of an Iranian gesture (rferl.org). In a similar vein, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas urged that "diplomacy has a chance," but she also stated that Iran needed to take credible action because time was running out. The Europeans maintained their openness while asserting that Iran had the upper hand in their public remarks, striking a careful balance between outreach and pressure (reuters.com).
U.S. officials in Washington noted Khamenei's comments but did not immediately make any concessions. The administration of Republican President Donald Trump, who led the push for the return to "maximum pressure," had previously assured the UN that Iran would "never be allowed" to acquire a nuclear weapon. In this timeline, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Iran not to target American forces or interests and stressed that the United States was not taking part in the recent military strikes on Iran.(President Trump separately praised Israel's June strikes, claiming that Iran "got hit hard" and that they were foolish to disregard his earlier "ultimatum," according to Reuters.com.) In summary, U.S. policy stayed the same: maintain military pressure, isolate Iran economically, and refuse to engage in negotiations without Iranian concessions. The United States did not appear to be changing its position on enrichment in response to Khamenei's remarks, but it did reiterate that Iran must comply with international demands if it hopes to have its sanctions lifted.
Israel, which sees Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat, responded to any Iranian intransigence with cautious approval. The June air campaign, known as "Operation Rising Lion," was already started by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an effort to "roll back the Iranian threat to Israel's very survival," according to Reuters.com. Israeli leaders reaffirmed that Iran must not be permitted to possess nuclear weapons in response to Khamenei's most recent remarks. Israeli officials have urged the United States to insist on zero enrichment, arguing that even the full JCPOA limits were insufficient. This is Tel Aviv's hardline position. In reality, Israel praised American assistance: Netanyahu expressed confidence that Israel could "finish the job" of eliminating the Iranian threat with "unflinching support" from America following the war on Iran's nuclear sites.
Gulf Arab nations, who have long been alarmed by Iran's nuclear aspirations and the instability in the region, continued to exercise extreme caution. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and other countries held emergency talks and urged moderation. Gulf leaders urged all sides to prevent a wider conflict after U.S. forces attacked Iran's nuclear sites in June. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Hasan Al-Hasan and other analysts cautioned that the United States' participation in the strikes was a "critical threshold" that ran the risk of entangling Gulf allies in a "devastating" conflict. Israel's unilateral attacks were harshly denounced by Oman, which has served as a backchannel mediator between Iran and the West. The country held Israel fully accountable for the attacks and described them as a "dangerous, reckless escalation." Even the UN, through Secretary-General António, denounced the strikes and called for everyone to exercise the utmost restraint.
In sum, there was broad international concern about any slide toward conflict, but also deep frustration. U.S. and EU leaders said they were ready to continue talks under the right circumstances, but that Iran must change course. Iran’s neighbors – especially the Gulf states and Israel – demanded guarantees that Iran would not enrich uranium further. Khamenei’s blanket rejection of U.S. engagement left many in the region worried that diplomacy had failed. At the same time, Moscow and Beijing weighed in with more traditional positions: Russia’s foreign ministry called the Israeli strikes a “violation of sovereignty”reuters.com, and China urged all parties to avoid escalating tensionsreuters.com.
Geopolitical, economic, and security implications
Khamenei’s refusal to negotiate with the U.S. has far-reaching implications. Geopolitically, the nuclear standoff is a focal point for broader Middle East tensions. It strains relations not only between Iran and the West but also within the region. Proxies and allies of Iran, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to militias in Iraq and Yemen, could feel emboldened or pressured depending on Iran’s choices. Conversely, Gulf Arab states and Israel, fearing Iranian threats, may accelerate their own security measures. Some Gulf analysts argue that without a credible diplomatic settlement, countries like Saudi Arabia or Egypt might consider acquiring their own nuclear capabilities, sparking a regional arms race.
Most immediately, the snapback of UN sanctions threatens to worsen Iran’s economic crisis. If the September deadline is not extended, the pre-2015 UN prohibitions on oil exports, financial transactions and arms sales will return. This will effectively freeze Iran’s assets abroad and bar foreign companies from doing business with the country’s oil and gas industries. Economists warn that Iran’s already reeling economy – burdened by inflation, unemployment and shortages – would take another severe hitapnews.com. With Iran accounting for about 20% of global oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz, any further disruption could have ripple effects on world energy markets. Indeed, during the June conflict global oil prices briefly spiked on fears of a broader Gulf war.
Security-wise, the crisis raises the spectre of direct confrontation. The world’s major military powers are now entangled: Israel has carried out airstrikes deep inside Iran, and the U.S. has both struck Iranian territory and been accused of co-operating with Israel. Iran, in turn, has vowed retaliation. Retired generals and analysts caution that any misstep – a missile fired in anger, or a stray drone – could trigger wider conflict. IISS’s Hasan Al-Hasan warned that if the U.S. and Iran descend into open war, Gulf states hosting U.S. forces (like Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar) could be drawn inreuters.com, potentially destabilizing an already volatile region. Even if war is averted, the security environment is likely to become more dangerous: Iran may press ahead with ballistic missile tests, cyberattacks or support for proxy attacks against U.S. or allied forces, while Israel keeps its military on high alert.
Another important consequence is the effect on non-proliferation norms. With Iran out of compliance and refusing dialogue, the JCPOA framework has effectively collapsed. The International Atomic Energy Agency is still present in Iran, but its inspectors have limited access. If Iran accelerates enrichment or further withdraws from oversight, its “breakout time” to a bomb could shrink to a matter of weeks. This would alarm countries like Israel or Saudi Arabia even more deeply. Some experts warn that as Iran tightens its alliance with China and Russia (who have offered diplomatic support), Western influence in Tehran may wane, making future deals even harder.
Economically, the sanctions snapback will also have global impacts. Airlines have already diverted routes to avoid the Middle East, and insurance premiums on shipping through the Gulf have risen. International firms will steer clear of Iran, slowing trade beyond oil – for example in commodities or technology. Humanitarian aid, admittedly exempt from sanctions, could be delayed or politicized, worsening hardships for ordinary Iranians. Analysts predict street protests may flare if living standards collapse further, testing the Iranian government’s grip on power.
Finally, Khamenei’s stance affects the prospects for diplomacy. On one hand, by ruling out U.S. talks, Tehran has broken the basis for any deal that Washington could accept. On the other hand, by demanding the U.S. lift all hostile policies first, Iran has also maintained its negotiating position for domestic consumption. Some observers suggest this could be a temporary tactic: Khamenei himself did not absolutely forbid Iranian negotiators from talking to the Americans, only said it was pointless under current U.S. policyarmscontrol.org. Still, most experts agree that without significant shifts on both sides, the coming months look bleak for diplomacy.
Expert perspectives
Experts and diplomats have offered insight on what comes next. A number emphasize that Khamenei’s decision reflects a broader internal debate in Iran. According to a report by the Soufan Center, hardline figures (aligned with Khamenei) see the June war as proof that Iran needs a nuclear deterrent, even though Khamenei’s own religious edict forbids a bomb. They argue moderates’ faith in diplomacy and arms reduction has failed to protect Iran from attackthesoufancenter.org. By contrast, pragmatic reformists note that Iran’s nuclear drive did not prevent the strikes and has left the country economically vulnerable. These moderates urge compromise, pointing out that clandestine nuclear or missile programs would be unsustainable under constant threat of bombingthesoufancenter.org.
At an international level, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi has warned time is short. He stated that negotiators “are running out of time” to reach a deal, but that an agreement “can be concluded quickly” if the political will existsarmscontrol.org. Grossi’s comments highlight the urgency: without an accord, IAEA inspections cannot fully resume and Iran could rapidly expand its capabilities unchecked. Similarly, UN diplomats say the snapback sanctions are now almost inevitable, which may leave only the question of their timing.
Strategic analysts also caution about unintended consequences. For example, Johns Hopkins professor Vali Nasr argued at the Aspen Security Forum that Iran now sees itself in a “long war” with Israel, focused on military preparedness, not purely diplomacythesoufancenter.org. He suggested that U.S. officials must consider not only whether Iran’s nuclear programme can be dismantled by force, but “whether it’s worth going to the table with the Iranians to negotiate something that actually would make this ceasefire have legs.” In other words, even if coercive strikes have delayed Iran’s enrichment, the deeper question is whether they have advanced peace or simply perpetuated the cycle of escalation.
Regional experts share this concern. Former officials and analysts in the Gulf note that the next step – reimposed sanctions and isolation of Iran – could provoke retaliatory actions. Iran’s parliament has already approved symbolic measures like closing the Strait of Hormuz if attackedreuters.com, an act that would send oil prices soaring. Others point out that a fully sanctioned Iran might turn even more urgently to its partners in China and Russia for trade and military support, deepening geopolitical rifts.
Conclusion
The impasse over Iran’s nuclear programme has reached a critical point. Khamenei’s hardline declaration that negotiations with the United States are a “dead end” has dashed hopes for a quick diplomatic fix before UN sanctions snap back. What happens next is uncertain. European leaders have indicated they will reluctantly let sanctions return if Iran does not alter course, but they also say they stand ready to resume talks if Iran meets their conditions. Israel and the U.S. appear to be doubling down on containment and deterrence, while Iran’s leadership digs in on its red lines.
If no new agreement is struck, Iran will find itself further isolated, its economy under renewed strain, and its nuclear programme unchecked by any international constraints. Such a scenario risks even greater volatility: a possible arms race in the Middle East, more covert or overt hostilities, and the erosion of non-proliferation norms. Conversely, any breakthrough would require convincing Iran that it can have economic relief and security without conceding its “right” to enrich uranium. As experts note, mutual distrust and recent conflict make that an exceedingly tough sell. For now, all eyes will be on the UN deadlines and the next moves of Tehran’s leadership. The future of the 2015 nuclear deal – and the region’s stability – hangs in the balance.
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